THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF TRADEMARKS ON THE
INTERNET
The advent of the Internet means incredible opportunity for global
interaction. Consumers in Asia can buy from a small business in
Louisiana, and businesses can advertise to a much wider market for a
fraction of the cost of traditional media. But these benefits come with a
dilemma: what to do about trademark infringement on the Internet. In a
virtual world with no borders, what (and where) is the law?

The Problem: the Special Case of the Internet
The expansion of the Internet has created an enormous consumers' market where many
businesses now advertise their products or services and communicate directly with consumers.
Trademark uses specific to the Internet, such as in domain names, meta-tags, hyperlinks and
framing, have introduced new means of infringement and new laws, which are outside the scope
of this iBrief. Even these Internet-specific means of infringement are still based on traditional
types of trademark infringement, such as false designation of origin, sponsorship, dilution and
unfair competition. The subject of this iBrief is traditional trademark infringement where a
trademark is simply displayed on a website as it would on more traditional forms of advertising,
like television or magazine ads.
The fact that the Internet is not in the world of bricks and mortar raises the question of
what actually constitutes trademark "use" on the Internet. That question may be more relevant or
more problematic when applied to domain names, meta tags, hyperlinks and framing, but when it
comes to traditional trademark infringement involving the video and audio appearance of a mark
on a web site, the mark is "used in commerce"1 the same way it is thought to be "used" in more
traditional forms of advertising or marketing. Most courts to address the issue have held that
whether a trademark on the Internet is being sufficiently "used" to merit a claim under trademark
law is determined by whether the website in question maintains personal jurisdiction in that
forum. 2 We will see that personal jurisdiction requires a requisite level of contacts, i.e. "use," in
the forum state. In effect, the question of trademark "use" spans both personal and subject matter
jurisdiction.
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The global nature of the medium is the unique aspect of trademark infringement on the
Internet. Transmissions over the World Wide Web instantly expose trademarks to millions of
Internet users around the world, creating problems since trademarks are protected on a "first in
time" to register basis and only in the jurisdiction of the country where they are registered and/or
used. 3 In addition, "what may be a perfectly lawful display of the trademark of another in one
country may constitute actionable infringement elsewhere."4 The possibility that a claim would
not be actionable in a foreign jurisdiction would encourage forum shopping5 for more than the
sake of convenience and a home court advantage. However, the perceived inadequacy of a
foreign forum is exactly the result of a conflict with foreign law, which, if severe enough, could
preclude the action altogether.
Trademark holders and trademark users on the Internet may be able to resolve some of
these conflicting problems on their own through private contracting. For instance, concurrent use
agreements can be arranged between competing users. Competing users of legitimate trademarks
may even consider establishing a joint website front page through which users may select the
website they wish to access.6 Measures could also be taken to reduce the risk of foreign courts
and regulators asserting jurisdiction over website conduct, or the risk of liability from infringing
foreign trademarks. Furthermore, maintaining the content of a website exclusively in a foreign
language may serve as a de facto disclaimer to personal jurisdiction, providing evidence that the
site is aimed exclusively at a different market and would not raise a likelihood of confusion in
other markets.7
Private agreements, however, will not likely resolve all trademark conflicts on the
Internet. Many trademark holders may not wish to share their marks, particularly if their ultimate
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goal is global use of the mark, because of the increased possibility of the likelihood of confusion8
and the probability that a mark could fall into the public domain. 9 Moreover, for businesses on
the Internet, establishing and maintaining a business identity and brand recognition is crucial
because the Internet is removing barriers to markets, facilitating new business models, and
fostering a global marketplace.10 To ensure protection of their trademarks, mark holders must be
able to rely on accessibility to courts and enforcement of court holdings.

The Questions Raised and the Cases that Raise Them
The questions that this iBrief purports to answer are concerned with the transborder and
interjurisdictional nature of trademark use on the Internet. First, does the Lanham Act reach
allegedly infringing activities conducted in foreign nations? In Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer
USA,11 subject matter jurisdiction arose when an American drug company alleged that a German
drug company used the "Bayer" trademark in violation of a contract dividing their concurrent use
of the mark. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc.,12 the Court extended
8

GOTO.Com, Inc. v. Disney, 202 F.3d 1199, 1207-10 (9th Cir. 2000). This court cites the Ninth
Circuit’s previous decision in Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment
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jurisdiction in order to enforce a previous injunction, thereby avoiding the question of whether
the jurisdictional scope of the Lanham Act may reach infringing activities on a website posted
from a foreign nation.
Assuming that jurisdiction under the Lanham Act is extended, how extensive is the scope
of a U.S. court enjoining a defendant's foreign activities?13 The Playboy court, in discussing the
ramifications of the case, stated that the Internet is a world-wide phenomenon, accessible from
every corner of the globe, and the defendant Italian publisher could not be prohibited from
operating its site merely because the site was accessible from one country in which the product
was banned. To hold otherwise "would be tantamount to a declaration that this Court, and every
other court throughout the world, may assert jurisdiction over all information providers on the
global World Wide Web."14
Could any foreign defendant be subjected to the personal jurisdiction of a U.S. court
simply by publishing a website on the Internet? Moreover, if, after jurisdiction was extended and
an injunction issued, would a foreign nation in which the defendant resides agree to enforce a
U.S. holding against its own citizen, especially if the foreign nation's trademark law conflicted
with U.S. law and the defendant had duly registered its trademark in the foreign nation and was
maintaining the website wholly in that nation? Although the court in Playboy permitted its
injunction to be satisfied by merely screening out U.S. users, thereby limiting its interference with
Italian law, the U.S. court could not realistically enforce that injunction without the cooperation
of the Italian government. Furthermore, if the defendant had not been able to restrict access
through passwords, (which most, if not all, websites are unable to do effectively) the same Court
would have required the defendant to shut the website down. 15 It is less likely that such an
injunction would have been enforced in Italy, since the website was completely legitimate there.
Such an injunction would conflict with the Playboy court's own reasoning that the defendant
cannot be prohibited from operating its site merely because the site is accessible from within one
country in which its product is banned.
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The "Extra-" Territorial Reach of U.S. Trademark Law
Both in the U.S. and internationally, trademark law is essentially "territorial," meaning a
mark is exclusively owned by a registrant or user only within each territory. 16 The Paris
Convention contains a "National Treatment" tenet in Article 2(1),17 which has supported a
territorial approach to choice of law in trademark cases18 (as well as copyright and patent cases,
which are outside the scope of this iBrief).

The territoriality of trademark law is further

expressed in the Convention in Article 6(3), which provides that "a mark duly registered in a
country of the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in the other countries
of the Union, including the country of origin."
In effect, the territoriality of trademark law should mean that each nation has its own
separate trademark laws that operate exclusively within that nation's borders. Therefore, U.S.
trademark law may not apply to actions occurring in foreign nations - actions that would
constitute infringement if they occurred in the United States - because the trademark law of the
foreign nation governs those actions within its borders. In such a case, those actions may not
even constitute infringement in the foreign nation if the complaining mark is simply not
registered or protected under that foreign nation's trademark law. Strictly speaking, those actions
within foreign borders do not constitute infringement in the U.S. either, for infringement under
U.S. law stops at the U.S. border.
A trademark does not cease to exist simply because the product it is attached to finds
itself outside the U.S. in a country where the mark is not registered. The question is specifically
whether an infringement of the U.S. mark can occur when the mark is outside the U.S. What if
the infringement is only problematic in the U.S.? Frequently, activities may have an impact that
is difficult to localize to a single nation, particularly when the activity is on the globally
16
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accessible Internet. On the Internet, an infringement can actually take place all over the world,
across borders, and in every jurisdiction. U.S. courts recognize the existence of infringement in
cases where the activity occurs within foreign borders, but only where the activity either involves
"parallel goods" or has substantial effects in the U.S., the latter triggering both "long-arm"
personal jurisdiction and an extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act necessary for federal subject
matter jurisdiction.

Universality Theory Stamped Out In Parallel Goods - But the "Territoriality" of
Parallel Goods Controls Foreign Parties
"Parallel imports" or "gray market goods" are goods bearing an authentic trademark that
are intended for distribution in foreign countries but which are instead imported and sold to the
ultimate consumer in a country where the trademark signifies a domestic source.19 The
territoriality theory in the U.S. provides a trademark holder with an exclusive monopoly right in
its trademark within the nation's borders, which actually provides the trademark holder with
rights against and control over a foreign holder of the same trademark when the foreign holder
attempts to bring his mark into the U.S.
If a foreign website viewed in the U.S., presenting a foreign trademark identical to a U.S.
registered trademark, is analogized to a form of digital importation, then the website may be
subject to the same customs preclusions as parallel goods. However, it seems that the only fair
way to determine whether the website is actually being digitally imported is to apply the tests for
personal jurisdiction. If such a website is subject to personal jurisdiction, then it certainly is
being imported into the U.S. Customs regulation of parallel goods may provide one form of
subject matter jurisdiction to such a website.

Personal Jurisdiction
For a court to hear a case, it must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant in
accordance with constitutional due process requirements. This may require use of state "long
arm" statutes. Initially, in determining whether there were sufficient contacts and activity for
establishing personal jurisdiction, courts relied on a medium-specific analysis of the Internet.
Distinguishing the Internet from traditional media, those courts held that website advertising was
inherently more likely to constitute purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of the
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forum state.20 However, the primary consideration in determining whether a website constitutes
purposeful availment has become whether the website is "active," rather than "passive." The
distinction between active, passive and their intermediate, interactive, websites was illustrated by
the court in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.21 The Zippo court delineated a
three-part "sliding scale" of Internet activity:

At one end of the spectrum are situations were a defendant clearly does
business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with
residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated
transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is
proper … at the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply
posted information on an Internet website which is accessible to users in
foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site … is not grounds for the
exercise [of] personal jurisdiction .... The middle ground is occupied by
interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the
host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined
by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the
exchange of information that occurs on the website.22
The Zippo court held that the defendant fell within the first category and exercised
jurisdiction over the California defendant who not only advertised on the Internet, but also sold
subscription to 3,000 state residents and entered into contracts with Internet service providers in
the forum state to download the electronic messages which formed the basis of the suit.23 The
Zippo "sliding scale" has been adopted in several circuits and numerous cases.24
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Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Like all U.S. courts, federal courts must have, in addition to personal jurisdiction, subject
matter jurisdiction in a case they are to hear. For federal courts, that jurisdiction is limited to
those types of cases designated by Congress, and in the context of this discussion, all actions
covered by the Lanham Act.
The Lanham Act provides a civil right of action against parties misusing (as detailed by
the Act) a mark used "in commerce."25 "Commerce" is defined in the Act as "all commerce
which may lawfully be regulated by Congress."26 Therefore, a U.S. court has subject matter
jurisdiction to hear a case under the Lanham Act if the defendant's activities occurred in
commerce that may be lawfully regulated by Congress. With the reigning broad interpretation of
interstate commerce,27 the Lanham Act, without reference to extraterritorial powers, clearly
controls infringing acts of the defendant which occur at least partly in the U.S., as when the
defendant ships infringing goods from a foreign nation to the United States.28 However, it is
when the activity, which would be infringing if occurring in the U.S., occurs solely in foreign
countries that the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act is raised (and implemented when the
foreign activity is held to "affect" U.S. commerce).29 Essentially, courts have applied the Lanham
Act to conduct occurring abroad, even in the absence of infringement within the United States.
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Most circuits apply some version of a three-part test that evaluates the effect of the
defendant's conduct on U.S. commerce, considers the citizenship, residency, location of business
operations, and location of corporate registration of the defendant, and the likelihood of conflict
between U.S. and the foreign law implicated by the defendant's activities.30

The circuits,

however, differ on how they apply this test. For example, they differ on the degree of the effect
that the defendant's conduct must have on U.S. commerce31 and on whether to limit the
consideration to the three-factored test.32 The Ninth Circuit applies a complicated balancing test
that it developed for the extraterritorial application of antitrust law: (1) There must be some effect
on U.S. foreign commerce, (2) "the effect must be substantially great to present a cognizable
injury" to plaintiffs under the federal statute, and (3) "the interest of and links to American
foreign commerce must be sufficiently strong in relation to those of other nations."33
In evaluating the third part of the test, the Ninth Circuit balances seven "comity" factors:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality of allegiance of the parties and
the locations of the principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement
by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the
United States as compared to elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or
effect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the
violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. 34 "In
other words, for a U.S. court to extend the Lanham Act to reach the foreign activity, the activity
must affect commerce between the United States and the foreign nation such that the United

there "[n]evertheless,... have been a number of decisions applying the Act to the exportation and
sale abroad of allegedly infringing merchandise, despite the lack of any showing that the
merchandise was likely to reenter the United States or cause any confusion within the United
States. Recently, a court even applied it to the performance of services in another country."
30
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597 (9th Cir. 1976)).
34
Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 428-29.

States would have an interest in resolving the case that is comparatively more significant than the
foreign jurisdiction's interest in resolving the case."35
A more difficult question of application arises when the infringing acts occur through the
sole use across national borders of a website. This issue had not yet been explicitly raised in any
U.S. case.36 Whether an extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act in such a case must be
considered at all depends on which real world activity we choose to analogize the Internet.37 If
sales in the U.S. conducted through a website are analogized to the shipment of goods from the
foreign nation hosting the website to the U.S., then the extraterritorial analysis is unnecessary
(although enforcement of the U.S. holding may rely on extraterritorial application). If, however,
the transactions are viewed as the result of consumers traveling to the foreign website and
conducting the sale in the foreign country, then the Lanham Act could only reach the defendant's
activities through an extraterritorial application. It is unclear how website activity would be
treated in such a case. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc.,38 a case
involving an Italian website using the mark "playmen," the Court would likely have rejected the
traveling analogy in favor of the shipping analogy because that Court rejected the defense's
argument that it was not distributing materials in the U.S. However, another court has treated the
issue as an extraterritorial matter.39 Nevertheless, in light of the Supreme Court's advice to other
courts to avoid all analogies in considering novel Internet issues in favor of medium-specific
treatment of the Internet,40 it is likely that the Supreme Court will be obliged to resolve this
question.
However the Court decides, and despite contentions to the contrary,41 whether these cases
are framed as extraterritorial is irrelevant, since personal jurisdiction, as well as subject matter
jurisdiction, must be established in every case. Many websites will not satisfy the requirements of
personal jurisdiction. Only foreign websites that can establish personal jurisdiction in the U.S.
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may fairly be considered as doing business in the U.S. and therefore actually conducting digital
importation into the U.S.

International Trademark Laws Provide the Basis for Extraterritorial Enforcement
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property serves as the basis for
current international trademark law. As already indicated above, the Paris Convention establishes
under article 2(1) a "national treatment" tenet to intellectual property in general, and under article
6(3) a territorial approach to trademarks in particular. However, despite the intention to preclude
extraterritorial application of individual nations' trademark laws, the Paris Convention's minimum
standards imposed on each member nation require certain recognition and interaction with foreign
trademarks, which has the effect of providing the authority to enforce remedies extraterritorially.
This is a very important tool because it will provide a way to reach even an ISP with operations
and assets in a favorable jurisdiction beyond, for example, the clutches of countries like France
and Germany with their stringent anti-nazi and anti-pornography enforcement. The ISP has to be
somewhere, and wherever it is the French and Germans will have the authority to expect
enforcement of their holdings and injunctions. The only glitch may be that if the substantive laws
of the country harboring the ISP conflict with French or German laws, the harboring country may
refuse to enforce the French/German injunction. Its right to do so is unclear.
Returning to the extraterritorial rules of the Paris Convention—Article 6bis requires the
prohibition of registration and use "of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation,
or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of the
country of registration or use to be well known in that country as being already the mark of a
person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar goods."42 The
mark may be well-known in a country without it being registered there or in use. For example, a
mark such as "Nike" would likely be well-known almost anywhere in the world, through its
appearance in all forms of the media, even if its products were not actively sold by the trademark
holders in those areas.43 Essentially, this rule provides for the extraterritorial reach of wellknown marks, and prevents bad faith registration and use meant to appropriate the goodwill of an
otherwise famous mark. In order to attain registerability or eligibility for protection, trademark
42
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Law: The Case for Limited Extraterritorial Reach of the Lanham Act, 37 Va. J. Int’l. L. 619, 638
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laws in different countries also normally require "use" of the trademark,44 the purpose of which is
to attempt to ensure good faith registration.
Furthermore, not only does the Paris Convention under Article 9(1) require all goods
unlawfully bearing a trademark or trade name to be seized on importation into countries where it
is entitled to protection, but under Article 9(2) "[s]eizure shall likewise be effected in the country
where the unlawful fixation occurred or in the country into which the goods were imported."
Article 9(2) provides for extraterritorial enforcement of a remedy to infringement. However,
Article 9(2) does not define "unlawful" fixation except that Article 9 shall apply in cases of false
designation of source under Article 10, which does not indicate that it shall be the "only" time
Article 9 is applied. Article 9 does beg the question of whether the fixation in country A is
actually "unlawful" when it would only be unlawful if the fixation occurred in country B, but the
goods will be shipped from country A to country B. The language of Article 9(2) is open to the
interpretation that if the goods are intended for country B and would be infringing there, then the
fixation of the marks in country A is unlawful and the goods bearing those marks on goods
intended for country B may be seized under Article 9. This power has the potential to swallow all
extraterritorial application of trademark laws unless it is limited to merely providing the authority
to expect enforcement of country A's infringement holdings in country B. However, determining
whether infringement has occurred in country A is subject to personal jurisdiction and subject
matter inquiries. As indicated above, personal jurisdiction inquiries are crucial in determining
whether a website can be viewed as digital shipping, i.e., importation, into country B.

Do We Need New Laws?
Sometimes the simplest legal approach is the most effective. As illustrated by the
number of issues addressed above, these problems are not simple, and might require a new law
created particularly for the Internet, as Reno v. ACLU seems to encourage.45 In order to
encompass all of the relevant fact patterns and issues, the new law would have to be quite
complex. The simple st approach would be to merely apply the existing legal rules-all of the tools
are already present, because as issues arose, they developed a de facto legal system to deal with
them. The key in codifying existing principles is to be imaginative enough to acknowledge and
draw all of the possible analogies to the Internet. The available domestic and international rules
for jurisdictional questions and conflicts, for copyright and for trademarks are presented above.
44

See Paris Convention Article 6quinquies (C)(1), "In determining whether a mark is eligible for
protection, all the factual circumstances must be taken into consideration, particularly the length
of time the mark has been in use."
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Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343-44 (1997).

The international rules and applications are there as well, even if they have not been very
explicitly and resoundingly applied.

The only reason that they have not been so broadly

vocalized is because, until the Internet, the issues did not arise very often.
The only real glitch may be that although the U.S. has all of the relevant rules in place,
other jurisdictions may not. There is also the additional problem of enforcement between nations.
While nations may have all of the relevant rules in place, transborder enforcement may be
impeded by conflicts between the substantive laws of the nations.

However, transborder

enforcement has always been and continues to be a political problem and the subject of treaties.
When extraterritorial enforcement of trademark law is stymied by conflicting foreign laws,
political figures need to step in and negotiate new treaties if they believe the law is worth
negotiation and enforcement.
Current treaties indicate a move among nations toward harmonization of intellectual
property laws.46

The harmonization of formerly conflicting foreign intellectual property laws

encourages the extraterritorial application of trademark law. Harmonization removes this last
true impediment to enforcement and makes more defensible giving extraterritorial effect to a
statute whose language, although ambiguous on the subject of extraterritoriality, covers statutory
subject matter on which there is considerable uniformity between countries, and consequently
less risk of conflict.47
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Schecter, supra note 44, at 632 ("With the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement at the end of
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